Applicants respectfully traverse the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections at least because neither *Bezviner et al.* nor *Edwards et al.* teach or suggest "determining whether there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects when it has been determined that the requested object is inactive," an aspect to which the pending claims are directed.

As to this aspect, claim 54, for example, recites "determining whether there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects when it has been determined that the requested object is inactive." Neither *Bezviner et al.* nor *Edwards et al.* teach or suggest this aspect of the pending claims, and the Office Action makes no mention of this limitation. Conventional systems do not remotely activate objects in a group of objects individually, and in such conventional systems, either all objects in a group are activated and the virtual machine is activated, or none are activated, and there is no virtual machine activated associated with the group. In these conventional systems, there is no virtual machine associated with the group when there is an inactive object in the group, and as a result, there is no reason to determine "whether there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects when it has been determined that the requested object is inactive," as recited in claim 54. Since *Bezviner et al.* and *Edwards et al.* do not teach or suggest this aspect of claim 54, the claim is patentable and claims 55-57 dependent therefrom are also patentable. Since pending claims 58-69 contain a similar limitation, they are also patentable for at least the same reason.

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Applicants also respectfully traverse the rejections of claims 54-69 at least because of two other aspects not taught or suggested by the cited references. Neither of the cited references teach or suggest "activating the requested object in the virtual machine associated with the group of objects when it is determined that there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects," an aspect to which pending claims 58-60, 65-66 and 68 are directed. Similarly, the cited references do not teach or suggest "activating the requested object of the group in the virtual machine such that at least one other object of the group remains inactive," an aspect to which pending claims 54-57, 61-64, 67, and 69 are directed.

As to the first of these two aspects, the cited references do not teach or suggest "activating the requested object . . . when it is determined that there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects" as recited, for example, in claim 58. As stated, neither of the cited references teach or suggest the aspect of "determining whether there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects when it has been determined that the requested object is inactive," and thus they do not activate the requested object "when it is determined that there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects." Conventional systems do not activate objects of a group individually and, as a result, do not have a virtual machine for the group and an inactive object in the group. As such, they do not activate "the requested object . . . when it is determined that there is a virtual machine associated with the group of objects." Since claims 58-60, 65-66, and 68 contain this limitation, they are patentable.

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Similarly, as to the second of these two aspects, neither *Bezviner et al.* nor *Edwards et al.* teach or suggest "activating the requested object of the group in the virtual machine such that at least one other object of the group remains inactive" as recited, for example, in claim 54. The cited references do not teach the activation of one object of the group "such that at least one other object of the group remains inactive." The debugging of code in *Edwards et al.* does not activate an object of the code, so "parts of the Java code of the target application not being debugged" (Office Action, p. 3) do not help teach or suggest this limitation. An object may be activated after compiling and running of the code, not during debugging of the code. Consequently, *Edwards et al.* does not activate a requested object of a group such that at least one other object of the group remains inactive. Since claims 54-57, 61-64, 67, and 69 contain this limitation, they are patentable.

Applicants have searched the references cited by the Examiner and found that none of the references, either alone or in any reasonable combination, teaches or suggests any of these aspects. Since each of the pending claims recites at least two aspects not taught or suggested, Applicants respectfully request the issuance of a Notice of Allowance. Applicants also respectfully request that the Examiner call Applicants' representative if she believes it would expedite prosecution.

If an extension of time of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is required to obtain entry of this Amendment, such extension is requested. If there are any fees due under 37 C.F.R. § § 1.16 or

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1.17 which are not enclosed herewith, including any fees required for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136, please charge such fees to our Deposit Account No. 06-916.

Respectfully submitted,

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y: <u>Jun Y</u>

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Dated: December 27, 2000

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